concerning civil government-第16部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


this　empire；　and　subject　himself　to　the　dominion　and　control　of　any

other　power？　To　which　it　is　obvious　to　answer；　that　though　in　the

state　of　Nature　he　hath　such　a　right；　yet　the　enjoyment　of　it　is

very　uncertain　and　constantly　exposed　to　the　invasion　of　others；　for

all　being　kings　as　much　as　he；　every　man　his　equal；　and　the　greater

part　no　strict　observers　of　equity　and　justice；　the　enjoyment　of　the

property　he　has　in　this　state　is　very　unsafe；　very　insecure。　This

makes　him　willing　to　quit　this　condition　which；　however　free；　is

full　of　fears　and　continual　dangers；　and　it　is　not　without　reason　that

he　seeks　out　and　is　willing　to　join　in　society　with　others　who　are

already　united；　or　have　a　mind　to　unite　for　the　mutual　preservation　of

their　lives；　liberties　and　estates；　which　I　call　by　the　general

name…　property。

　　124。　The　great　and　chief　end；　therefore；　of　men　uniting　into

commonwealths；　and　putting　themselves　under　government；　is　the

preservation　of　their　property；　to　which　in　the　state　of　Nature

there　are　many　things　wanting。

　　Firstly；　there　wants　an　established；　settled；　known　law；　received

and　allowed　by　common　consent　to　be　the　standard　of　right　and　wrong；

and　the　common　measure　to　decide　all　controversies　between　them。　For

though　the　law　of　Nature　be　plain　and　intelligible　to　all　rational

creatures；　yet　men；　being　biased　by　their　interest；　as　well　as

ignorant　for　want　of　study　of　it；　are　not　apt　to　allow　of　it　as　a

law　binding　to　them　in　the　application　of　it　to　their　particular

cases。

　　125。　Secondly；　in　the　state　of　Nature　there　wants　a　known　and

indifferent　judge；　with　authority　to　determine　all　differences

according　to　the　established　law。　For　every　one　in　that　state　being

both　judge　and　executioner　of　the　law　of　Nature；　men　being　partial

to　themselves；　passion　and　revenge　is　very　apt　to　carry　them　too

far；　and　with　too　much　heat　in　their　own　cases；　as　well　as

negligence　and　unconcernedness；　make　them　too　remiss　in　other　men's。

　　126。　Thirdly；　in　the　state　of　Nature　there　often　wants　power　to　back

and　support　the　sentence　when　right；　and　to　give　it　due　execution。

They　who　by　any　injustice　offended　will　seldom　fail　where　they　are

able　by　force　to　make　good　their　injustice。　Such　resistance　many　times

makes　the　punishment　dangerous；　and　frequently　destructive　to　those

who　attempt　it。

　　127。　Thus　mankind；　notwithstanding　all　the　privileges　of　the　state

of　Nature；　being　but　in　an　ill　condition　while　they　remain　in　it　are

quickly　driven　into　society。　Hence　it　comes　to　pass；　that　we　seldom

find　any　number　of　men　live　any　time　together　in　this　state。　The

inconveniencies　that　they　are　therein　exposed　to　by　the　irregular

and　uncertain　exercise　of　the　power　every　man　has　of　punishing　the

transgressions　of　others；　make　them　take　sanctuary　under　the

established　laws　of　government；　and　therein　seek　the　preservation　of

their　property。　It　is　this　that　makes　them　so　willingly　give　up

every　one　his　single　power　of　punishing　to　be　exercised　by　such

alone　as　shall　be　appointed　to　it　amongst　them；　and　by　such　rules　as

the　community；　or　those　authorised　by　them　to　that　purpose；　shall

agree　on。　And　in　this　we　have　the　original　right　and　rise　of　both

the　legislative　and　executive　power　as　well　as　of　the　governments

and　societies　themselves。

　　128。　For　in　the　state　of　Nature　to　omit　the　liberty　he　has　of

innocent　delights；　a　man　has　two　powers。　The　first　is　to　do　whatsoever

he　thinks　fit　for　the　preservation　of　himself　and　others　within　the

permission　of　the　law　of　Nature；　by　which　law；　common　to　them　all；

he　and　all　the　rest　of　mankind　are　one　community；　make　up　one

society　distinct　from　all　other　creatures；　and　were　it　not　for　the

corruption　and　viciousness　of　degenerate　men；　there　would　be　no　need

of　any　other；　no　necessity　that　men　should　separate　from　this　great

and　natural　community；　and　associate　into　lesser　combinations。　The

other　power　a　man　has　in　the　state　of　Nature　is　the　power　to　punish

the　crimes　committed　against　that　law。　Both　these　he　gives　up　when

he　joins　in　a　private；　if　I　may　so　call　it；　or　particular　political

society；　and　incorporates　into　any　commonwealth　separate　from　the　rest

of　mankind。

　　129。　The　first　power…　viz。；　of　doing　whatsoever　he　thought　fit　for

the　preservation　of　himself　and　the　rest　of　mankind；　he　gives　up　to　be

regulated　by　laws　made　by　the　society；　so　far　forth　as　the

preservation　of　himself　and　the　rest　of　that　society　shall　require；

which　laws　of　the　society　in　many　things　confine　the　liberty　he　had　by

the　law　of　Nature。

　　130。　Secondly；　the　power　of　punishing　he　wholly　gives　up；　and

engages　his　natural　force；　which　he　might　before　employ　in　the

execution　of　the　law　of　Nature；　by　his　own　single　authority；　as　he

thought　fit；　to　assist　the　executive　power　of　the　society　as　the　law

thereof　shall　require。　For　being　now　in　a　new　state；　wherein　he　is

to　enjoy　many　conveniencies　from　the　labour；　assistance；　and　society

of　others　in　the　same　community；　as　well　as　protection　from　its

whole　strength；　he　is　to　part　also　with　as　much　of　his　natural

liberty；　in　providing　for　himself；　as　the　good；　prosperity；　and　safety

of　the　society　shall　require；　which　is　not　only　necessary　but　just；

since　the　other　members　of　the　society　do　the　like。

　　131。　But　though　men　when　they　enter　into　society　give　up　the

equality；　liberty；　and　executive　power　they　had　in　the　state　of　Nature

into　the　hands　of　the　society；　to　be　so　far　disposed　of　by　the

legislative　as　the　good　of　the　society　shall　require；　yet　it　being

only　with　an　intention　in　every　one　the　better　to　preserve　himself；

his　liberty　and　property　（for　no　rational　creature　can　be　supposed

to　change　his　condition　with　an　intention　to　be　worse）；　the　power　of

the　society　or　legislative　constituted　by　them　can　never　be　supposed

to　extend　farther　than　the　common　good；　but　is　obliged　to　secure　every

one's　property　by　providing　against　those　three　defects　above

mentioned　that　made　the　state　of　Nature　so　unsafe　and　uneasy。　And

so；　whoever　has　the　legislative　or　supreme　power　of　any

commonwealth；　is　bound　to　govern　by　established　standing　laws；

promulgated　and　known　to　the　people；　and　not　by　extemporary　decrees；

by　indifferent　and　upright　judges；　who　are　to　decide　controversies

by　those　laws；　and　to　employ　the　force　of　the　community　at　home　only

in　the　execution　of　such　laws；　or　abroad　to　prevent　or　redress　foreign

injuries　and　secure　the　community　from　inroads　and　invasion。　And　all

this　to　be　directed　to　no　other　end　but　the　peace；　safety；　and

public　good　of　the　people。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　X

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Forms　of　a　Commonwealth



　　132。　THE　majority　having；　as　has　been　showed；　upon　men's　first

uniting　into　society；　the　whole　power　of　the　community　naturally　in

them；　may　employ　all　that　power　in　making　laws　for　the　community

from　time　to　time；　and　executing　those　laws　by　officers　of　their　own

appointing；　and　then　the　form　of　the　government　is　a　perfect

democracy；　or　else　may　put　the　power　of　making　laws　into　the　hands

of　a　few　select　men；　and　their　heirs　or　successors；　and　then　it　is

an　oligarchy；　or　else　into　the　hands　of　one　man；　and　then　it　is　a

monarchy；　if　to　him　and　his　heirs；　it　is　a　hereditary　monarchy；　if

to　him　only　for　life；　but　upon　his　death　the　power　only　of

nominating　a　successor；　to　return　to　them；　an　elective　monarchy。　And

so　accordingly　of　these　make　compounded　and　mixed　forms　of　government；

as　they　think　good。　And　if　the　legislative　power　be　at　first　given

by　the　majority　to　one　or　more　persons　only　for　their　lives；　or　any

limited　time；　and　then　the　supreme　power　to　revert　to　them　again；　when

it　is　so　reverted　the　community　may　dispose　of　it　again　anew　into　what

hands　they　please；　and　so　constitute　a　new　form　of　government；　for　the

form　of　government　depending　upon　the　placing　the　supreme　power；　which

is　the　legislative；　it　being　impossible　to　conceive　that　an　inferior

power　should　prescribe　to　a　superior；　or　any　but　the　supreme　make

laws；　according　as　the　power　of　making　laws　is　placed；　such　is　the

form　of　the　commonwealth。

　　133。　By　〃commonwealth〃　I　must　be　understood　all　along　to　mean　not

a　democracy；　or　any　form　of　government；　but　any　independent

community　which　the　Latins　signified　by　the　word　civitas；　to　which　the

word　which　best　answers　in　our　language　is　〃commonwealth；〃　and　most

properly　expresses　such　a　society　of　men　which　〃community〃　does　not

（for　there　may　be　subordinate　communities　in　a　government）；　and　〃city〃

much　less。　And　therefore；　to　avoid　ambiguity；　I　crave　leave　to　use　the

word　〃commonwealth〃　in　that　sense；　in　which　sense　I　find　the　word　used

by　King　James　himself；　which　I　think　to　be　its　genuine

signification；　which；　if　anybody　dislike；　I　consent　with　him　to　change

it　for　a　better。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XI

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Extent　of　the　Legislative　Power



　　134。　THE　great　end　of　men's　entering　into　society　being　the

enjoyment　of　their　properties　in　peace　and　safety；　and　the　great

instrument　and　means　of　that　being　the　laws　established　in　that

society；　the　first　and　fundamental　positive　law　of　all　commonwealths

is　the　establishing　of　the　legislative　power；　as　the　first　and

fundamental　natural　law　which　is　to　govern　even　the　legislative。

Itself　is　the　preservation　of　the　society　and　（as　far　as　will

consist　with　the　public　good）　of　every　person　in　it。　This

legislative　is　not　only　the　supreme　power　of　the　commonwealth；　but

sacred　and　unalterable　in　the　hands　where　the　community　have　once

placed　it。　Nor　can　any　edict　of　anybody　else；　in　what　form　soever

conceived；　or　by　what　power　soever　backed；　have　the　force　and

obligation　of　a　law　which　has　not　its　sanction　from　that　legislative

which　the　public　has　chosen　and　appointed；　for　without　this　the　law

could　not　have　that　which　is　absolutely　necessary　to　its　being　a

law；　the　consent　of　the　society；　over　whom　nobody　can　have　a　power

to　make　laws*　but　by　their　own　consent　and　by　authority　received

from　them；　and　therefore　all　the　obedience；　which　by