philosophy of right-第14部分
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
one…sided form in opposition to the subjective phase of will ； it is direct reality； or
external existence。 In this sense the will becomes objective only by the execution
of its ends。
Remark： These logical phases of subjectivity and objectivity； since they are often made use of in
the sequel； are here exposed； with the express purpose of noting that it happens with them as with
other distinctions and opposed aspects of reflection； they by virtue of their finite and dialectic
character pass over into their opposites。 For imagination and understanding the meanings of
antithetic phases are not convertible； because their identity is still internal。 But in will； on the
contrary； these phases； which ought to be at once abstract and yet also sides of that which can be
known only as concrete； lead of themselves to identity； and to an exchange of meaning。 To the
understanding this is unintelligible。 Thus； e。g。； the will； as a freedom which exists in itself； is
subjectivity itself； thus subjectivity is the conception of the will； and therefore its objectivity。 But
subjectivity is finite in opposition to objectivity； yet in this opposition the will is ＇lot isolated； but in
intricate union with the object ； and thus its finitude consists quite as much in its not being
subjective； etc。 What in the sequel is to be meant by the subjective or the objective side of the will；
has each time to be made clear from the context； which will supply their positions in relation to the
totality。
Addition。 It is ordinarily supposed that subjective and objective are blank opposites ； but this is
not the case。 Rather do they pass into one another； for they are not abstract aspects like positive
and negative； but have already a concrete significance。 To consider in the first instance the
expression 〃subjective；〃 this may mean an end which is merely the end of a certain subject。 In this
sense a poor work of art； that is not adequate to the thing is merely subjective。 But； further； this
expression may point to the content of the will； and is then of about the same meaning as
capricious； the subjective content then is that which belongs merely to the subject。 In this sense
bad acts are merely subjective。 Further； the pure； empty I may be called subjective； as it has only
itself as an object； and possesses the power of abstraction from all further content。 Subjectivity
has； moreover； a wholly particular and correct meaning in accordance with which anything； in
order to win recognition from me； has to become mine and seek validity in me。 This is the infinite
avarice of subjectivity； eager to comprehend and consume everything within the simple and pure I。
Similarly we may take the objective in different ways。 By it we may understand anything to which
we give existence in contrast to ourselves； whether it be an actual thing or a mere thought； which
we place over against ourselves。 By it also we understand the direct reality； in which the end is to
be realised。 Although the end itself is quite particular and subjective； we yet name it objective after
it has made its appearance。 Further； the objective will is also that in which truth is； thus； God's will；
the ethical will also； are objective。 Lastly； we may call the will objective； when it is wholly
submerged in its object； as； e。g。； the child's will； which is confiding and without subjective
freedom； and the slave's will； which does not know itself as free； and is thus a will…less will。 In this
sense any will is objective； if it is guided in its action by a foreign authority； and has not yet
completed the infinite return into itself。
§ 27。
The absolute character or； if you like； the absolute impulse of the free spirit （§
21） is； as has been observed； that its freedom shall be for it an object。 It is to be
objective in a two…fold sense： it is the rational system of itself； and this system is
to be directly real （§ 26）。 There is thus actualised as idea what the will is
implicitly。 Hence； the abstract conception of the idea of the will is in general the
free will which wills the free will。
§ 28。
The activity of the will； directed to the task of transcending the contradiction
between subjectivity and objectivity； of transferring its end from subjectivity into
objectivity； and yet while in objectivity of remaining with itself； is beyond the
formal method of consciousness （§ 8）； in which objectivity is only direct
actuality。 This activity is the essential development of the substantive content of
the idea （§ 21）。 In this development the conception moulds the idea； which is in
the first instance abstract； into the totality of a system。 This totality as substantive
is independent of the opposition between mere subjective end and its realisation；
and in both of these forms is the same。
§ 29。
That a reality is the realisation of the free will； this is what is meant by a right。
Right； therefore； is； in general； freedom as idea。
Remark： In the Kantian doctrine （Introduction to Kant's Theory of Right）； now generally
accepted； 〃the； highest factor is a limitation of my freedom or caprice； in order that it may be able
to subsist alongside of every other individual's caprice in accordance with a universal law。〃 This
doctrine contains only a negative phase； that of limitation。 And besides； the positive phase； the
universal law or so…called law of reason； consisting in the agreement of the caprice of one with that
of another； goes beyond the well…known formal identity and the proposition of contradiction。 The
definition of right； just quoted； contains the view which has especially since Rousseau spread
widely。 According to this view neither the absolute and rational will； nor the true spirit； but the will
and spirit of the particular individual in their peculiar caprice； are the substantive and primary basis。
When once this principle is accepted； the rational can announce itself only as limiting this freedom。
Hence it is not an inherent rationality； but only a mere external and formal universal。 This view is
accordingly devoid of speculative thought； and is rejected by the philosophic conception。 In the
minds of men and in the actual world it has assumed a shape； whose horror is without a parallel；
except in the shallowness of the thoughts upon which it was founded。
§ 30。
Right in general is something holy； because it is the embodiment of the absolute
conception and self…conscious freedom。 But the formalism of right； and after a
while of duty also； is due to distinctions arising out of the development of the
conception of freedom。 In contrast with the more formal； abstract and limited
right； there is that sphere or stage of the spirit； in which spirit has brought to
definite actuality the further elements contained in the idea。 This stage is the
richer and more concrete； it is truly universal and has therefore a higher right。
Remark： Every step in the development of the idea of freedom has its peculiar right； because it
is the embodiment of a phase of freedom。 When morality and ethical life are spoken of in
opposition to right； only the first or formal right of the abstract personality is meant。 Morality；
ethical life； a state…interest； are every one a special right； because each of these is a definite
realisation of freedom。 They can come into collision only in so far as they occupy the same plane。
If the moral standpoint of spirit were not also a right and one of the forms of freedom； it could not
collide with the right of personality or any other right。 A right contains the conception of freedom
which is the highest phase of spirit； and in opposition to it any other kind of thing is lacking in real
substance。 Yet collision also implies a limit and a subordination of one phase to another。 Only the
right of the world…spirit is the unlimited absolute。
§ 31。
The scientific method by which the conception is self…evolved； and its phases
self…developed and self…produced； is not first of all an assurance that certain
relations are given from somewhere or other； and then the application to this
foreign material of the universal。 The true process is found in the logic； and here
is presupposed。
Remark： The efficient or motive principle； which is not merely the analysis but the production of
the several elements of the universal； I call dialectic。 Dialectic is not that process in which an object
or proposition； presented； to feeling or the direct consciousness； is analysed； entangled； taken
hither and thither； until at last its contrary is derived。 Such a merely negative method appears
frequently in Plato。 It may fix the opposite of any notion； or reveal the contradiction contained in it；
as did the ancient scepticism； or it may in a feeble way consider an approximation to truth； or
modern half…and…half attainment of it； as its goal。 But the higher dialectic of the conception does
not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and opposite； but produces out of this negative a
positive content and result。 Only by such a course is there development and inherent progress。
Hence this dialectic is not the external agency of subjective thinking； but the private soul of the
content； which unfolds its branches and fruit organically。 Thought regards this development of the
idea and of the peculiar activity of the reason of the idea as only subjective； but is on its side
unable to make any addition。 To consider anything rationally is not to bring reason to it from the
outside； and work it up in this way； but to count it as itself reasonable。 Here it is spirit in its
freedom； the summit of self…conscious reason； which gives itself actuality； and produces itself as
the existing world。 The business of science is simply to bring the specific work of the reason；
which is in the thing； to consciousness。
§ 32。
The phases of the development of the conception are themselves conceptions。
And yet； because the conception is essentially the idea； they have the form of
manifestations。 Hence the sequence of the conce
