philosophy of right-第15部分
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And yet； because the conception is essentially the idea； they have the form of
manifestations。 Hence the sequence of the conceptions； which arise in this way； is
at the same time a sequence of realisations； and are to be by science so
considered。
Remark： In a speculative sense the way； in which a conception is manifested in reality； is
identical with a definite phase of the conception。 But it is noteworthy that； in the scientific
development of the idea； the elements； which result in a further definite form； although preceding
this result as phases of the conception； do not in the temporal development go before it as
concrete realisations。 Thus； as will be seen later； that stage of the idea which is the family
presupposes phases of the conception； whose result it is。 But that these internal presuppositions
should be present in such visible realisations as right of property； contract； morality； etc。； this is the
other side of the process； which only in a highly developed civilisation has attained to a specific
realisation of its elements。
Addition。 The idea must always go on determining itself within itself； since at the beginning it is
only abstract conception。 However； this initial abstract conception is never given up； but only
becomes inwardly richer； the last phase being the richest。 The earlier and merely implicit phases
reach in this way free self…dependence； but in such a manner that the conception remains the soul
which holds everything together； and only through a procedure immanent within itself arrives at its
own distinctions。 Hence the last phase falls again into a unity with the first； and it cannot be said
that the conception ever comes to something new。 Although the elements of the conception appear
to have fallen apart when they enter reality； this is only a mere appearance。 Its superficial character
is revealed in the process； since all the particulars finally turn back again into the conception of the
universal。 The empirical sciences usually analyse what they find in pictorial ideas； and if the
individual is successfully brought back to the general； the general property is then called the
conception。 But this is not our procedure。 We desire only to observe how the conception
determines itself； and compels us to keep at a distance everything of our own spinning and
thinking。 But what we get in this way is one series of thoughts and another series of realised forms。
As to these two series； it may happen that the order of time of the actual manifestations is partly
different from the order of the conception。 Thus it cannot； e。g。； be said that property existed
before the family； and yet； in spite of that it is discussed before the family is discussed。 The
question might also be raised here； Why do we not begin with the highest； i。e。； with concrete truth
？ The answer is； because we desire to see truth in the form of a result； and it is an essential part of
the process to conceive the conception first of all as abstract。 The actual series of realisations of
the conception is thus for us in due course as follows； even although in actuality the order should
be the same。 Our process is this； that the abstract forms reveal themselves not as self … subsistent
but as untrue。
Division of the Work。
§ 33。
According to the stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will；
A。 The will is direct or immediate； its conception is therefore； abstract； i。e。；
personality； and its embodied reality is a direct external thing。 This is the sphere
of abstract or formal right。
B。 The will； passing out of external reality； turns back into itself。 Its phase is
subjective individuality； and it is contrasted with the universal。 This universal is
on its internal side the good； and on its external side a presented world； and these
two sides are occasioned only by means of each other。 In this sphere the idea is
divided； and exists in separate elements。 The right of the subjective will is in a
relation of contrast to the right of the world； or the right of the idea。 Here；
however； the idea exists only implicitly。 This is the sphere of morality。
C。 The unity and truth of these two abstract elements。 The thought idea of the
good is realised both in the will turned back into itself； and also in the external
world。 Thus freedom exists as real substance； which is quite as much actuality
and necessity as it is subjective will。 The idea here is its absolutely universal
existence； viz。； ethical life。 This ethical substance is again；
a。 Natural spirit； the family；
b。 The civil society； or spirit in its dual existence and mere appearance；
c。 The state； or freedom； which； while established in the free
self…dependence of the particular will is also universal and objective。 This
actual and organic spirit ＇a＇ is the spirit of a nation； ＇b＇ is found in the
relation to one another of national spirits； and ＇c＇ passing through and
beyond this relation is actualised and revealed in world history as the
universal world…spirit； whose right is the highest。
Note。 It is to be found in the speculative logic； and here is presupposed； that a thing or content；
which is established first of all according to its conception； or implicitly； has the form of direct
existence。 The conception； however； when it has the form of the conception is explicit； and no
longer is a direct existence。 So； too； the principle； upon which the division of this work proceeds；
is presupposed。 The divisions might be regarded as already settled by history； since the different
stages must be viewed as elements in the development of the idea； and therefore as springing from
the nature of the content itself。 A philosophic division is not an external classification of any given
material； such a classification as would be made according to one or several schemes picked up at
random； but the inherent distinctions of the conception itself。 Morality and ethical life； which are
usually supposed to mean the same thing； are here taken in essentially different meanings。
Meanwhile even imaginative thought seems to make a distinction between them。 In the usage of
Kant the preference is given to the term morality； and the practical principles of his philosophy limit
themselves wholly to this standpoint； making impossible the standpoint of ethical life； and indeed
expressly destroying and abolishing it。 Although morality and ethics have the same meaning
according to their etymology； yet these different words may be used for different conceptions。
Addition。 When we speak of right； we mean not only civil right； which is the usual significance
of the word； but also morality； ethical life and world…history。 These belong to this realm； because
the conception taking them in their truth； brings them all together。 Free will； in order not to remain
abstract； must in the first instance give itself reality； the sensible materials of this reality are objects；
i。e。； external things。 This first phase of freedom we shall know as property。 This is the sphere of
formal and abstract right； to which belong property in the more developed form of contract and
also the injury of right； i。e。； crime and punishment。 The freedom； we have here； we name person；
or； in other words； the subject who is free； and indeed free independently； and gives himself a
reality in things。 But this direct reality is not adequate to freedom； and the negation of this phase is
morality。 In morality I am beyond the freedom found directly in this thing； and have a freedom in
which this directness is superseded。 I am free in myself； i。e。； in the subjective。 In this sphere we
come upon my insight； intention； and end； and externality is established as indifferent。 The good is
now the universal end； which is not to remain merely internal to me； but to realise itself。 The
subjective will demands that its inward character； or purpose； shall receive external reality； and
also that the good shall be brought to completion in external existence。 Morality； like formal right；
is also an abstraction； whose truth is reached only in ethical life。 Hence ethical life is the unity of the
will in its conception with the will of the individual or subject。 The primary reality of ethical life is in
its turn natural； taking the form of love and feeling。 This is the family。 In it the individual has
transcended his prudish personality； and finds himself with his consciousness in a totality。 In the
next stage is seen the loss of this peculiar ethical existence and substantive unity。 Here the family
falls asunder； and the members become independent one of another； being now held together
merely by the bond of mutual need。 This is the stage of the civil society； which has frequently been
taken for the state。 But the state does not arise until we reach the third stage； that stage of ethical
life or spirit； in which both individual independence and universal substantivity are found in gigantic
union。 The right of the state is； therefore； higher than that of the other stages。 It is freedom in its
most concrete embodiment； which yields to nothing but the highest absolute truth of the
world…spirit。
First Part： Abstract Right
§ 34。
The absolutely free will； at the stage when its concept is abstract； has the
determinate character of immediacy。 Accordingly this stage is its negative
actuality； an actuality contrasted with the real world； only an abstractly
self…related actuality — the inherently single will of a subject。 Pursuant to the
moment of the particularity of the will； it has in addition a content consisting of
determinate aims and； as exclusive individuality； it has this content at the same
time as an external world directly confronting it。
Addition： When I say that 'the absolutely free will at the stage when its concept is abstract has
the determinate character of immediacy'； what I mean is this： when the concept had fully realised
itself and when the embodiment of the concept had become nothing but the unfolding of its own
self； then that state of affairs would be the fully developed Idea of the
