the science of right-第16部分

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right　of　being　possessor　for　the　time；　and　the　length　of　the　period　of

his　neglecting　to　do　so…　which　need　not　necessarily　be　particularly

defined…　can　be　referred　to　only　as　establishing　the　certainty　of　this

neglect。　And　it　would　contradict　the　postulate　of　the　juridically

practical　reason　to　maintain　that　one　hitherto　unknown　as　a　possessor；

and　whose　possessory　activity　has　at　least　been　interrupted；　whether

by　or　without　fault　of　his　own；　could　always　at　any　time　re…acquire

a　property；　for　this　would　be　to　make　all　ownership　uncertain　（dominia

rerum　incerta　facere）。

　　But　if　he　is　a　member　of　the　commonwealth　or　civil　union；　the

state　may　maintain　his　possession　for　him　vicariously；　although　it　may

be　interrupted　as　private　possession；　and　in　that　case　the　actual

possessor　will　not　be　able　to　prove　a　title　of　acquisition　even　from　a

first　occupation；　nor　to　found　upon　a　title　of　usucapion。　But；　in

the　state　of　nature；　usucapion　is　universally　a　rightful　ground　of

holding；　not　properly　as　a　juridical　mode　of　requiring　a　thing；　but　as

a　ground　for　maintaining　oneself　in　possession　of　it　where　there　are

no　juridical　acts。　A　release　from　juridical　claims　is　commonly　also

called　acquisition。　The　prescriptive　title　of　the　older　possessor；

therefore；　belongs　to　the　sphere　of　natural　right　（est　juris　naturae）。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　34。　II。　Acquisition　by　Inheritance。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Acquisitio　haereditatis）。



　　Inheritance　is　constituted　by　the　transfer　（translatio）　of　the

property　or　goods　of　one　who　is　dying　to　a　survivor；　through　the

consent　of　the　will　of　both。　The　acquisition　of　the　heir　who　takes　the

estate　（haeredis　instituti）　and　the　relinquishment　of　the　testator　who

leaves　it；　being　the　acts　that　constitute　the　exchange　of　the　mine　and

thine；　take　place　in　the　same　moment　of　time…　in　articulo　mortis…

and　just　when　the　testator　ceases　to　be。　There　is　therefore　no　special

act　of　transfer　（translatio）　in　the　empirical　sense；　for　that　would

involve　two　successive　acts；　by　which　the　one　would　first　divest

himself　of　his　possession；　and　the　other　would　thereupon　enter　into

it。　Inheritance　as　constituted　by　a　simultaneous　double　act　is；

therefore；　an　ideal　mode　of　acquisition。　Inheritance　is

inconceivable　in　the　state　of　nature　without　a　testamentary

disposition　（dispositio　ultimae　voluntatis）；　and　the　question　arises

as　to　whether　this　mode　of　acquisition　is　to　be　regarded　as　a　contract

of　succession；　or　a　unilateral　act　instituting　an　heir　by　a　will

（testamentum）。　The　determination　of　this　question　depends　on　the

further　question；　whether　and　how；　in　the　very　same　moment　in　which

one　individual　ceases　to　be；　there　can　be　a　transition　of　his　property

to　another　person。　Hence　the　problem；　as　to　how　a　mode　of

acquisition　by　inheritance　is　possible；　must　be　investigated

independently　of　the　various　possible　forms　in　which　it　is　practically

carried　out；　and　which　can　have　place　only　in　a　commonwealth。

　　〃It　is　possible　to　acquire　by　being　instituted　or　appointed　heir

in　a　testamentary　disposition。〃　For　the　testator　Caius　promises　and

declares　in　his　last　will　to　Titius；　who　knows　nothing　of　this

promise；　to　transfer　to　him　his　estate　in　case　of　death；　but　thus

continuing　as　long　as　he　lives　sole　owner　of　it。　Now　by　a　mere

unilateral　act　of　will；　nothing　can　in　fact　be　transmitted　to

another　person；　as　in　addition　to　the　promise　of　the　one　party　there

is　required　acceptance　（acceptatio）　on　the　part　of　the　other；　and　a

simultaneous　bilateral　act　of　will　（voluntas　simultanea）　which；

however；　is　here　awanting。　So　long　as　Caius　lives；　Titius　cannot

expressly　accept　in　order　to　enter　on　acquisition；　because　Caius　has

only　promised　in　case　of　death；　otherwise　the　property　would　be　for

a　moment　at　least　in　common　possession；　which　is　not　the　will　of　the

testator。　However；　Titius　acquires　tacitly　a　special　right　to　the

inheritance　as　a　real　right。　This　is　constituted　by　the　sole　and

exclusive　right　to　accept　the　estate　（jus　in　re　jacente）；　which　is

therefore　called　at　that　point　of　time　a　haereditas　jacens。　Now　as

every　man…　because　he　must　always　gain　and　never　lose　by　it…

necessarily；　although　tacitly；　accepts　such　a　right；　and　as　Titius

after　the　death　of　Caius　is　in　this　position；　he　may　acquire　the

succession　as　heir　by　acceptance　of　the　promise。　And　the　estate　is　not

in　the　meantime　entirely　without　an　owner　（res　nullius）；　but　is　only

in　abeyance　or　vacant　（vacua）；　because　he　has　exclusively　the　right　of

choice　as　to　whether　he　will　actually　make　the　estate　bequeathed　to

him　his　own　or　not。

　　Hence　testaments　are　valid　according　to　mere　natural　right　（sunt

juris　naturae）。　This　assertion　however；　is　to　be　understood　in　the

sense　that　they　are　capable　and　worthy　of　being　introduced　and

sanctioned　in　the　civil　state；　whenever　it　is　instituted。　For　it　is

only　the　common　will　in　the　civil　state　that　maintains　the

possession　of　the　inheritance　or　succession；　while　it　hangs　between

acceptance　or　rejection　and　specially　belongs　to　no　particular

individual。



　　　　　　　　35。　III。　The　Continuing　Right　of　a　Good　Name

　　　　　　　　　　　　after　Death。　（Bona　fama　Defuncti）。



　　It　would　be　absurd　to　think　that　a　dead　person　could　possess

anything　after　his　death；　when　he　no　longer　exists　in　the　eye　of　the

law；　if　the　matter　in　question　were　a　mere　thing。　But　a　good　name　is　a

congenital　and　external；　although　merely　ideal；　possession；　which

attaches　inseparably　to　the　individual　as　a　person。　Now　we　can　and

must　abstract　here　from　all　consideration　as　to　whether　the　persons

cease　to　be　after　death　or　still　continue　as　such　to　exist；　because；

in　considering　their　juridical　relation　to　others；　we　regard　persons

merely　according　to　their　humanity　and　as　rational　beings　（homo

noumenon）。　Hence　any　attempt　to　bring　the　reputation　or　good　name　of　a

person　into　evil　and　false　repute　after　death；　is　always　questionable；

even　although　a　well…founded　charge　may　be　allowed…　for　to　that　extent

the　brocard　〃De　mortuis　nil　nisi　bene〃*　is　wrong。　Yet　to　spread

charges　against　one　who　is　absent　and　cannot　defend　himself；　shows

at　least　a　want　of　magnanimity。



　　*＇Let　nothing　be　said　of　the　dead　but　what　is　favourable。＇



　　By　a　blameless　life　and　a　death　that　worthily　ends　it；　nothing

ends　it；　it　is　admitted　that　a　man　may　acquire　a　（negatively）　good

reputation　constituting　something　that　is　his　own；　even　when　he　no

longer　exists　in　the　world　of　sense　as　a　visible　person　（homo

phaenomenon）。　It　is　further　held　that　his　survivors　and　successors…

whether　relatives　or　strangers…　are　entitled　to　defend　his　good　name

as　a　matter　of　right；　on　the　ground　that　unproved　accusations

subject　them　all　to　the　danger　of　similar　treatment　after　death。　Now

that　a　man　when　dead　can　yet　acquire　such　a　right　is　a　peculiar　and；

nevertheless；　an　undeniable　manifestation　in　fact；　of　the　a　priori

law…giving　reason　thus　extending　its　law　of　command　or　prohibition

beyond　the　limits　of　the　present　life。　If　some　one　then　spreads　a

charge　regarding　a　dead　person　that　would　have　dishonoured　him　when

living；　or　even　made　him　despicable；　any　one　who　can　adduce　a　proof

that　this　accusation　is　intentionally　false　and　untrue　may　publicly

declare　him　who　thus　brings　the　dead　person　into　ill　repute　to　be　a

calumniator；　and　affix　dishonour　to　him　in　turn。　This　would　not　be

allowable　unless　it　were　legitimate　to　assume　that　the　dead　person　was

injured　by　the　accusation；　although　he　is　dead；　and　that　a　certain

just　satisfaction　was　done　to　him　by　an　apology；　although　he　no　longer

sensibly　exists。　A　title　to　act　the　part　the　vindicator　of　the　dead

person　does　not　require　to　be　established；　for　every　one　necessarily

claims　this　of　himself；　not　merely　as　a　duty　of　virtue　regarded

ethically；　but　as　a　right　belonging　to　him　in　virtue　of　his

humanity。　Nor　does　the　vindicator　require　to　show　any　special　personal

damage；　accruing　to　him　as　a　friend　or　relative；　from　a　stain　on　the

character　of　the　deceased；　to　justify　him　in　proceeding　to　censure　it。

That　such　a　form　of　ideal　acquisition；　and　even　a　right　in　an

individual　after　death　against　survivors；　is　thus　actually　founded；

cannot；　therefore；　be　disputed；　although　the　possibility　of　such　a

right　is　not　capable　of　logical　deduction。



　　There　is　no　ground　for　drawing　visionary　inferences　from　what　has

just　been　stated；　to　the　presentiment　of　a　future　life　and　invisible

relations　to　departed　souls。　For　the　considerations　connected　with

this　right　turn　on　nothing　more　than　the　purely　moral　and　juridical

relation　which　subsists　among　men；　even　in　the　present　life；　as

rational　beings。　Abstraction　is；　however；　made　from　all　that　belongs

physically　to　their　existence　in　space　and　time；　that　is；　men　are

considered　logically　apart　from　these　physical　concomitants　of　their

nature；　not　as　to　their　state　when　actually　deprived　of　them；　but　only

in　so　far　as　being　spirits　they　are　in　a　condition　that　might

realize　the　injury　done　them　by　calumniators。　Any　one　who　may

falsely　say　something　against　me　a　hundred　years　hence　injures　me　even

now。　For　in　the　pure　juridical　relation；　which　is　entirely　rational

and　surprasensible；　abstraction　is　made　from　the　physical　conditions

of　time；　and　the　calumniator　is　as　culpable　as　if　he　had　committed　the

offence　in　my　lifetime；　only　this　will　not　be　tried　by　a　criminal

process；　but　he　will　only　be　punished　with　that　loss　of　honour　he

would　have　caused　to　another；　and　this　is　inflicted　upon　him　by　public

opinion　according　to　the　lex　talionis。　Even　a　plagiarism　from　a　dead

author；　although　it　does　not　tarnish　the　honour　of　the　deceased；　but

only　deprives　him　of　a　part　of　his　property；　is　yet　properly

regarded　as　a　lesion　of　his　human　right。

CH3

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。

　　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　Acquisition　Conditioned　by　t