the science of right-第15部分

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　　According　to　Adam　Smith：　〃Money　has　become；　in　all　civilized

nations；　the　universal　instrument　of　commerce；　by　the　intervention

of　which　goods　of　all　kinds　are　bought　and　sold　or　exchanged　for　one

another。〃　This　definition　expands　the　empirical　conception　of　money　to

the　rational　idea　of　it；　by　taking　regard　only　to　the　implied　form

of　the　reciprocal　performances　in　the　onerous　contracts；　and　thus

abstracting　from　their　matter。　It　is　thus　conformable　to　the

conception　of　right　in　the　permutation　and　exchange　of　the　mine　and

thine　generally　（commutatio　late　sic　dicta）。　The　definition；

therefore；　accords　with　the　representation　in　the　above　synopsis　of

a　dogmatic　division　of　contracts　a　priori；　and　consequently　with　the

metaphysical　principle　of　right　in　general。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　What　is　a　Book？



　　A　book　is　a　writing　which　contains　a　discourse　addressed　by　some　one

to　the　public；　through　visible　signs　of　speech。　It　is　a　matter　of

indifference　to　the　present　considerations　whether　it　is　written　by

a　pen　or　imprinted　by　types；　and　on　few　or　many　pages。　He　who　speaks

to　the　public　in　his　own　name　is　the　author。　He　who　addresses　the

writing　to　the　public　in　the　name　of　the　author　is　the　publisher。　When

a　publisher　does　this　with　the　permission　or　authority　of　the

author；　the　act　is　in　accordance　with　right；　and　he　is　the　rightful

publisher；　but　if　this　is　done　without　such　permission　or　authority；

the　act　is　contrary　to　right；　and　the　publisher　is　a　counterfeiter

or　unlawful　publisher。　The　whole　of　a　set　of　copies　of　the　original

document　is　called　an　edition。



　　　　　　The　Unauthorized　Publishing　of　Books　is　Contrary　to　the

　　　　　　　　　Principles　of　Right；　and　is　Rightly　Prohibited。



　　A　writing　is　not　an　immediate　direct　presentation　of　a　conception；

as　is　the　case；　for　instance；　with　an　engraving　that　exhibits　a

portrait；　or　a　bust　or　cast　by　a　sculptor。　It　is　a　discourse　addressed

in　a　particular　form　to　the　public；　and　the　author　may　be　said　to

speak　publicly　by　means　of　his　publisher。　The　publisher；　again；　speaks

by　the　aid　of　the　printer　as　his　workman　（operarius）；　yet　not　in　his

own　name；　for　otherwise　he　would　be　the　author；　but　in　the　name　of　the

author；　and　he　is　only　entitled　to　do　so　in　virtue　of　a　mandate

given　him　to　that　effect　by　the　author。　Now　the　unauthorized　printer

and　publisher　speaks　by　an　assumed　authority　in　his　publication；　in

the　name　indeed　of　the　author；　but　without　a　mandate　to　that　effect

（gerit　se　mandatarium　absque　mandato）。　Consequently　such　an

unauthorized　publication　is　a　wrong　committed　upon　the　authorized

and　only　lawful　publisher；　as　it　amounts　to　a　pilfering　of　the　profits

which　the　latter　was　entitled　and　able　to　draw　from　the　use　of　his

proper　right　（furtum　usus）。　Unauthorized　printing　and　publication　of

books　is；　therefore；　forbidden…　as　an　act　of　counterfeit　and　piracy…

on　the　ground　of　right。

　　There　seems；　however；　to　be　an　impression　that　there　is　a　sort　of

common　right　to　print　and　publish　books；　but　the　slightest

reflection　must　convince　any　one　that　this　would　be　a　great　injustice。

The　reason　of　it　is　found　simply　in　the　fact　that　a　book；　regarded

from　one　point　of　view；　is　an　external　product　of　mechanical　art　（opus

mechanicum）；　that　can　be　imitated　by　any　one　who　may　be　in　rightful

possession　of　a　copy；　and　it　is　therefore　his　by　a　real　right。

　　But；　from　another　point　of　view；　a　book　is　not　merely　an　external

thing；　but　is　a　discourse　of　the　publisher　to　the　public；　and　he　is

only　entitled　to　do　this　publicly　under　the　mandate　of　the　author

（praestatio　operae）；　and　this　constitutes　a　personal　right。　The

error　underlying　the　impression　referred　to；　therefore；　arises　from　an

interchange　and　confusion　of　these　two　kinds　of　right　in　relation　to

books。



　　　　　　　　　　Confusion　of　Personal　Right　and　Real　Right。



　　The　confusion　of　personal　right　with　real　right　may　be　likewise

shown　by　reference　to　a　difference　of　view　in　connection　with

another　contract；　falling　under　the　head　of　contracts　of　hiring　（B　II。

I）；　namely；　the　contract　of　lease　（jus　incolatus）。　The　question　is

raised　as　to　whether　a　proprietor　when　he　has　sold　a　house　or　a

piece　of　ground　held　on　lease；　before　the　expiry　of　the　period　of

lease；　was　bound　to　add　the　condition　of　the　continuance　of　the

lease　to　the　contract　of　purchase；　or　whether　it　should　be　held　that

〃purchase　breaks　hire；〃　of　course　under　reservation　of　a　period　of

warning　determined　by　the　nature　of　the　subject　in　use。　In　the

former　view；　a　house　or　farm　would　be　regarded　as　having　a　burden

lying　upon　it；　constituting　a　real　right　acquired　in　it　by　the　lessee；

and　this　might　well　enough　be　carried　out　by　a　clause　merely　indorsing

or　ingrossing　the　contract　of　lease　in　the　deed　of　sale。　But　as　it

would　no　longer　then　be　a　simple　lease；　another　contract　would

properly　be　required　to　be　conjoined；　a　matter　which　few　lessors　would

be　disposed　to　grant。　The　proposition；　then；　that　〃Purchase　breaks

hire〃　holds　in　principle；　for　the　full　right　in　a　thing　as　a

property　overbears　all　personal　right；　which　is　inconsistent　with

it。　But　there　remains　a　right　of　action　to　the　lessee；　on　the　ground

of　a　personal　right　for　indemnification　on　account　of　any　loss　arising

from　breaking　of　the　contract。



　　　　　EPISODICAL　SECTION。　The　Ideal　Acquisition　of　External

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Objects　of　the　Will。

　　　　　　　　　32。　The　Nature　and　Modes　of　Ideal　Acquisition。



　　I　call　that　mode　of　acquisition　ideal　which　involves　no　causality　in

time；　and　which　is　founded　upon　a　mere　idea　of　pure　reason。　It　is

nevertheless　actual；　and　not　merely　imaginary　acquisition：　and　it　is

not　called　real　only　because　the　act　of　acquisition　is　not

empirical。　This　character　of　the　act　arises　from　the　peculiarity

that　the　person　acquiring　acquires　from　another　who　either　is　not　yet；

and　who　can　only　be　regarded　as　a　possible　being；　or　who　is　just

ceasing　to　be；　or　who　no　longer　is。　Hence　such　a　mode　of　attaining

to　possession　is　to　be　regarded　as　a　mere　practical　idea　of　reason。

　　There　are　three　modes　of　ideal　acquisition：

　　　　I。　Acquisition　by　usucapion；

　　　　II。　Acquisition　by　inheritance　or　succession；

　　　　III。　Acquisition　by　undying　merit　（meritum　immortale）；　or　the

claim　by　right　to　a　good　name　at　death。

　　These　three　modes　of　acquisition　can；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　only　have

effect　in　a　public　juridical　state　of　existence；　but　they　are　not

founded　merely　upon　the　civil　constitution　or　upon　arbitrary　statutes；

they　are　already　contained　a　priori　in　the　conception　of　the　state

of　nature；　and　are　thus　necessarily　conceivable　prior　to　their

empirical　manifestation。　The　laws　regarding　them　in　the　civil

constitution　ought　to　be　regulated　by　that　rational　conception。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　33。　I。　Acquisition　by　Usucapion。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Acquisitio　per　Usucapionem）。



　　I　may　acquire　the　property　of　another　merely　by　long　possession

and　use　of　it　（usucapio）。　Such　property　is　not　acquired；　because　I　may

legitimately　presume　that　his　consent　is　given　to　this　effect　（per

consensum　praesumptum）；　nor　because　I　can　assume　that；　as　he　does

not　oppose　my　acquisition　of　it；　he　has　relinquished　or　abandoned　it

as　his　（rem　derelictam）。　But　I　acquire　it　thus　because；　even　if

there　were　any　one　actually　raising　a　claim　to　this　property　as　its

true　owner；　I　may　exclude　him　on　the　ground　of　my　long　possession　of

it；　ignore　his　previous　existence；　and　proceed　as　if　he　existed　during

the　time　of　my　possession　as　a　mere　abstraction；　although　I　may　have

been　subsequently　apprized　of　his　reality　as　well　as　of　his　claim。

This　mode　of　acquisition　is　not　quite　correctly　designated　acquisition

by　prescription　（per　praescriptionem）；　for　the　exclusion　of　all

other　claimants　is　to　be　regarded　as　only　the　consequence　of　the

usucapion；　and　the　process　of　acquisition　must　have　gone　before　the

right　of　exclusion。　The　rational　possibility　of　such　a　mode　of

acquisition　has　now　to　be　proved。

　　Any　one　who　does　not　exercise　a　continuous　possessory　activity

（actus　possessorius）　in　relation　to　a　thing　as　his　is　regarded　with

good　right　as　one　who　does　not　at　all　exist　as　its　possessor。　For　he

cannot　complain　of　lesion　so　long　as　he　does　not　qualify　himself

with　a　title　as　its　possessor。　And　even　if　he　should　afterwards　lay

claim　to　the　thing　when　another　has　already　taken　possession　of　it；　he

only　says　he　was　once　on　a　time　owner　of　it；　but　not　that　he　is　so

still；　or　that　his　possession　has　continued　without　interruption　as

a　juridical　fact。　It　can；　therefore；　only　be　a　juridical　process　of

possession；　that　has　been　maintained　without　interruption　and　is

proveable　by　documentary　fact；　that　any　one　can　secure　for　himself

what　is　his　own　after　ceasing　for　a　long　time　to　make　use　of　it。

　　For；　suppose　that　the　neglect　to　exercise　this　possessory　activity

had　not　the　effect　of　enabling　another　to　found　upon　his　hitherto

lawful；　undisputed　and　bona　fide　possession；　and　irrefragable　right　to

continue　in　its　possession　so　that　he　may　regard　the　thing　that　is

thus　in　his　possession　as　acquired　by　him。　Then　no　acquisition　would

ever　become　peremptory　and　secured；　but　all　acquisition　would　only

be　provisory　and　temporary。　This　is　evident　on　the　ground　that　there

are　no　historical　records　available　to　carry　the　investigation　of　a

title　back　to　the　first　possessor　and　his　act　of　acquisition。　The

presumption　upon　which　acquisition　by　usucapion　is　founded　is；

therefore；　not　merely　its　conformity　to　right　as　allowed　and　just；　but

also　the　presumption　of　its　being　right　（praesumtio　juris　et　de　jure）；

and　its　being　assumed　to　be　in　accordance　with　compulsory　laws

（suppositio　legalis）。　Anyone　who　has　neglected　to　embody　his

possessory　act　in　a　documentary　title　has　lost　his　claim　to　the

right　of　being　possessor　for　the　time；　and　the　length　of　the　period　of

his　neglecting　to　do　so…　which　nee