gorgias-第13部分

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perhaps；　the　evil　has　more　of　them？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　must　we　not　infer；　that　the　bad　man　is　as　good　and　bad　as　the　good；　or；　perhaps；　even　better？…is　not　this　a　further　inference　which　follows　equally　with　the　preceding　from　the　assertion　that　the　good　and　the　pleasant　are　the　same：…can　this　be　denied；　Callicles？　　　Cal。　I　have　been　listening　and　making　admissions　to　you；　Socrates；　and　I　remark　that　if　a　person　grants　you　anything　in　play；　you；　like　a　child；　want　to　keep　hold　and　will　not　give　it　back。　But　do　you　really　suppose　that　I　or　any　other　human　being　denies　that　some　pleasures　are　good　and　others　bad？　　　Soc。　Alas；　Callicles；　how　unfair　you　are！　you　certainly　treat　me　as　if　I　were　a　child；　sometimes　saying　one　thing；　and　then　another；　as　if　you　were　meaning　to　deceive　me。　And　yet　I　thought　at　first　that　you　were　my　friend；　and　would　not　have　deceived　me　if　you　could　have　helped。　But　I　see　that　I　was　mistaken；　and　now　I　suppose　that　I　must　make　the　best　of　a　bad　business；　as　they　said　of　old；　and　take　what　I　can　get　out　of　you。…Well；　then；　as　I　understand　you　to　say；　I　may　assume　that　some　pleasures　are　good　and　others　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　The　beneficial　are　good；　and　the　hurtful　are　evil？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　the　beneficial　are　those　which　do　some　good；　and　the　hurtful　are　those　which　do　some　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Take；　for　example；　the　bodily　pleasures　of　eating　and　drinking；　which　were　just　now　mentioning…you　mean　to　say　that　those　which　promote　health；　or　any　other　bodily　excellence；　are　good；　and　their　opposites　evil？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　in　the　same　way　there　are　good　pains　and　there　are　evil　pains？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　ought　we　not　to　choose　and　use　the　good　pleasures　and　pains？　　　Cal。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　But　not　the　evil？　　　Cal。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Because；　if　you　remember；　Polus　and　I　have　agreed　that　all　our　actions　are　to　be　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good…and　will　you　agree　with　us　in　saying；　that　the　good　is　the　end　of　all　our　actions；　and　that　all　our　actions　are　to　be　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　and　not　the　good；　for　of　them？…will　you　add　a　third　vote　to　our　two？　　　Cal。　I　will。　　　Soc。　Then　pleasure；　like　everything　else；　is　to　be　sought　for　the　sake　of　that　which　is　good；　and　not　that　which　is　good　for　the　sake　of　pleasure？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　But　can　every　man　choose　what　pleasures　are　good　and　what　are　evil；　or　must　he　have　art　or　knowledge　of　them　in　detail？　　　Cal。　He　must　have　art。　　　Soc。　Let　me　now　remind　you　of　what　I　was　saying　to　Gorgias　and　Polus；　I　was　saying；　as　you　will　not　have　forgotten；　that　there　were　some　processes　which　aim　only　at　pleasure；　and　know　nothing　of　a　better　and　worse；　and　there　are　other　processes　which　know　good　and　evil。　And　I　considered　that　cookery；　which　I　do　not　call　an　art；　but　only　an　experience；　was　of　the　former　class；　which　is　concerned　with　pleasure；　and　that　the　art　of　medicine　was　of　the　class　which　is　concerned　with　the　good。　And　now；　by　the　god　of　friendship；　I　must　beg　you；　Callicles；　not　to　jest；　or　to　imagine　that　I　am　jesting　with　you；　do　not　answer　at　random　and　contrary　to　your　real　opinion…for　you　will　observe　that　we　are　arguing　about　the　way　of　human　life；　and　to　a　man　who　has　any　sense　at　all；　what　question　can　be　more　serious　than　this？…whether　he　should　follow　after　that　way　of　life　to　which　you　exhort　me；　and　act　what　you　call　the　manly　part　of　speaking　in　the　assembly；　and　cultivating　rhetoric；　and　engaging　in　public　affairs；　according　to　the　principles　now　in　vogue；　or　whether　he　should　pursue　the　life　of　philosophy…and　in　what　the　latter　way　differs　from　the　former。　But　perhaps　we　had　better　first　try　to　distinguish　them；　as　I　did　before；　and　when　we　have　come　to　an　agreement　that　they　are　distinct；　we　may　proceed　to　consider　in　what　they　differ　from　one　another；　and　which　of　them　we　should　choose。　Perhaps；　however；　you　do　not　even　now　understand　what　I　mean？　　　Cal。　No；　I　do　not。　　　Soc。　Then　I　will　explain　myself　more　clearly：　seeing　that　you　and　I　have　agreed　that　there　is　such　a　thing　as　good；　and　that　there　is　such　a　thing　as　pleasure；　and　that　pleasure　is　not　the　same　as　good；　and　that　the　pursuit　and　process　of　acquisition　of　the　one；　that　is　pleasure；　is　different　from　the　pursuit　and　process　of　acquisition　of　the　other；　which　is　good…I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　you　agree　with　me　thus　far　or　not…do　you　agree？　　　Cal。　I　do。　　　Soc。　Then　I　will　proceed；　and　ask　whether　you　also　agree　with　me；　and　whether　you　think　that　I　spoke　the　truth　when　I　further　said　to　Gorgias　and　Polus　that　cookery　in　my　opinion　is　only　an　experience；　and　not　an　art　at　all；　and　that　whereas　medicine　is　an　art；　and　attends　to　the　nature　and　constitution　of　the　patient；　and　has　principles　of　action　and　reason　in　each　case；　cookery　in　attending　upon　pleasure　never　regards　either　the　nature　or　reason　of　that　pleasure　to　which　she　devotes　herself；　but　goes　straight　to　her　end；　nor　ever　considers　or　calculates　anything；　but　works　by　experience　and　routine；　and　just　preserves　the　recollection　of　what　she　has　usually　done　when　producing　pleasure。　And　first；　I　would　have　you　consider　whether　I　have　proved　what　I　was　saying；　and　then　whether　there　are　not　other　similar　processes　which　have　to　do　with　the　soul…some　of　them　processes　of　art；　making　a　provision　for　the　soul's　highest　interest…others　despising　the　interest；　and；　as　in　the　previous　case；　considering　only　the　pleasure　of　the　soul；　and　how　this　may　be　acquired；　but　not　considering　what　pleasures　are　good　or　bad；　and　having　no　other　aim　but　to　afford　gratification；　whether　good　or　bad。　In　my　opinion；　Callicles；　there　are　such　processes；　and　this　is　the　sort　of　thing　which　I　term　flattery；　whether　concerned　with　the　body　or　the　soul；　or　whenever　employed　with　a　view　to　pleasure　and　without　any　consideration　of　good　and　evil。　And　now　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　you　agree　with　us　in　this　notion；　or　whether　you　differ。　　　Cal。　I　do　not　differ；　on　the　contrary；　I　agree；　for　in　that　way　I　shall　soonest　bring　the　argument　to　an　end；　and　shall　oblige　my　friend　Gorgias。　　　Soc。　And　is　this　notion　true　of　one　soul；　or　of　two　or　more？　　　Cal。　Equally　true　of　two　or　more。　　　Soc。　Then　a　man　may　delight　a　whole　assembly；　and　yet　have　no　regard　for　their　true　interests？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Can　you　tell　me　the　pursuits　which　delight　mankind…or　rather；　if　you　would　prefer；　let　me　ask；　and　do　you　answer；　which　of　them　belong　to　the　pleasurable　class；　and　which　of　them　not？　In　the　first　place；　what　say　you　of　flute…playing？　Does　not　that　appear　to　be　an　art　which　seeks　only　pleasure；　Callicles；　and　thinks　of　nothing　else？　　　Cal。　I　assent。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　the　same　true　of　all　similar　arts；　as；　for　example；　the　art　of　playing　the　lyre　at　festivals？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say　of　the　choral　art　and　of　dithyrambic　poetry？…are　not　they　of　the　same　nature？　Do　you　imagine　that　Cinesias　the　son　of　Meles　cares　about　what　will　tend　to　the　moral　improvement　of　his　hearers；　or　about　what　will　give　pleasure　to　the　multitude？　　　Cal。　There　can　be　no　mistake　about　Cinesias；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say　of　his　father；　Meles　the　harp…player？　Did　he　perform　with　any　view　to　the　good　of　his　hearers？　Could　he　be　said　to　regard　even　their　pleasure？　For　his　singing　was　an　infliction　to　his　audience。　And　of　harp　playing　and　dithyrambic　poetry　in　general；　what　would　you　say？　Have　they　not　been　invented　wholly　for　the　sake　of　pleasure？　　　Cal。　That　is　my　notion　of　them。　　　Soc。　And　as　for　the　Muse　of　Tragedy；　that　solemn　and　august　personage…what　are　her　aspirations？　Is　all　her　aim　and　desire　only　to　give　pleasure　to　the　spectators；　or　does　she　fight　against　them　and　refuse　to　speak　of　their　pleasant　vices；　and　willingly　proclaim　in　word　and　song　truths　welcome　and　unwelcome？…which　in　your　judgment　is　her　character？　　　Cal。　There　can　be　no　doubt；　Socrates；　that　Tragedy　has　her　face　turned　towards　pleasure　and　the　gratification　of　the　audience。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　that　the　sort　of　thing；　Callicles；　which　we　were　just　now　describing　as　flattery？　　　Cal。　Quite　true。　　　Soc。　Well　now；　suppose　that　we　strip　all　poetry　of　song　and　rhythm　and　metre；　there　will　remain　speech？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　this　speech　is　addressed　to　a　crowd　of　people？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then；　poetry　is　a　sort　of　rhetoric？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　do　not　the　poets　in　the　theatres　seem　to　you　to　be　rhetoricians？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　now　we　have　discovered　a　sort　of　rhetoric　which　is　addressed　to　a　crowd　of　men；　women；　and　children；　freemen　and　slaves。　And　this　is　not　much　to　our　taste；　for　we　have　described　it　as　having　the　nature　of　flattery。　　　Cal。　Quite　true。　　　Soc。　Very　good。　And　what　do　you　say　of　that　other　rhetoric　which　addresses　the　Athenian　assembly　and　the　assemblies　of　freemen　in　other　states？　Do　the　rhetoricians　appear　to　you　always　to　aim　at　what　is　best；　and　do　they　seek　to　improve　the　citizens　by　their　speeches；　or　are　they　too；　like　the　rest　of　mankind；　bent　upon　giving　them　pleasure；　forgetting　the　public　good　in　the　thought　of　their　own　interest；　playing　with　the　people　as　with　children；　and　trying　to　amuse　them；　but　never　considering　whether　they　are　better　or　worse　for　this？　　　Cal。　I　must　distinguish。　There　are　some　who　have　a　real　care　of　the　public　in　what　they　say；　while　others　are　such　as　you　describe。　　　Soc。　I　am　contented　with　the　admission　that　rhetoric　is　of　two　sorts；　one；　which　is　mere　flattery　and　disgraceful　declamation；　the　other；　which　is　noble　and　aims　at　the　training　and　improvement　of　the　souls　of　the　citizens；　and　strives　to　say　what　is　best；　whether　welcome　or　unwelcome；　to　the　audience；　but　have　you　ever　known　such　a　rhetoric；　or　if　you　have；　and　can　point　out　any　rhetorician　who　is　of　this　stamp；　who　is　he？　　　Cal。　But；　indeed；　I　am　afraid　that　I　cannot　tell　you　of　any　such　among　the　orators　who　are　at　present　living。　　　Soc。　Well；　then；　can　you　mention　any　one　of　a　former　generation；　who　may　be　said　to　have　improved　the　Athenians；　who　found　them　worse　and　made　them　better；　from　the　day　that　he　began　to　make　speeches？　for；　indeed；　I　do　not　know　of　such　a　man。　　　Cal。　What！　did　you　never　hear　that　Themistocles　was　a　good　man；　and　Cimon　and　Miltiades　and　Pericles；　who　is　just　lately　dead；　and　whom