gorgias-第14部分

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Themistocles　was　a　good　man；　and　Cimon　and　Miltiades　and　Pericles；　who　is　just　lately　dead；　and　whom　you　heard　yourself？　　　Soc。　Yes；　Callicles；　they　were　good　men；　if；　as　you　said　at　first；　true　virtue　consists　only　in　the　satisfaction　of　our　own　desires　and　those　of　others；　but　if　not；　and　if；　as　we　were　afterwards　compelled　to　acknowledge；　the　satisfaction　of　some　desires　makes　us　better；　and　of　others；　worse；　and　we　ought　to　gratify　the　one　and　not　the　other；　and　there　is　an　art　in　distinguishing　them…can　you　tell　me　of　any　of　these　statesmen　who　did　distinguish　them？　　　Cal。　No；　indeed；　I　cannot。　　　Soc。　Yet；　surely；　Callicles；　if　you　look　you　will　find　such　a　one。　Suppose　that　we　just　calmly　consider　whether　any　of　these　was　such　as　I　have　described。　Will　not　the　good　man；　who　says　whatever　he　says　with　a　view　to　the　best；　speak　with　a　reference　to　some　standard　and　not　at　random；　just　as　all　other　artists；　whether　the　painter；　the　builder；　the　shipwright；　or　any　other　look　all　of　them　to　their　own　work；　and　do　not　select　and　apply　at　random　what　they　apply；　but　strive　to　give　a　definite　form　to　it？　The　artist　disposes　all　things　in　order；　and　compels　the　one　part　to　harmonize　and　accord　with　the　other　part；　until　he　has　constructed　a　regular　and　systematic　whole；　and　this　is　true　of　all　artists；　and　in　the　same　way　the　trainers　and　physicians；　of　whom　we　spoke　before；　give　order　and　regularity　to　the　body：　do　you　deny　this？　　　Cal。　No；　I　am　ready　to　admit　it。　　　Soc。　Then　the　house　in　which　order　and　regularity　prevail　is　good；　that　in　which　there　is　disorder；　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　same　is　true　of　a　ship？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　the　human　body？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　would　you　say　of　the　soul？　Will　the　good　soul　be　that　in　which　disorder　is　prevalent；　or　that　in　which　there　is　harmony　and　order？　　　Cal。　The　latter　follows　from　our　previous　admissions。　　　Soc。　What　is　the　name　which　is　given　to　the　effect　of　harmony　and　order　in　the　body？　　　Cal。　I　suppose　that　you　mean　health　and　strength？　　　Soc。　Yes；　I　do；　and　what　is　the　name　which　you　would　give　to　the　effect　of　harmony　and　order　in　the　soul？　Try　and　discover　a　name　for　this　as　well　as　for　the　other。　　　Cal。　Why　not　give　the　name　yourself；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　Well；　if　you　had　rather　that　I　should；　I　will；　and　you　shall　say　whether　you　agree　with　me；　and　if　not；　you　shall　refute　and　answer　me。　〃Healthy；〃　as　I　conceive；　is　the　name　which　is　given　to　the　regular　order　of　the　body；　whence　comes　health　and　every　other　bodily　excellence：　is　that　true　or　not？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　〃lawful〃　and　〃law〃　are　the　names　which　are　given　to　the　regular　order　and　action　of　the　soul；　and　these　make　men　lawful　and　orderly：…and　so　we　have　temperance　and　justice：　have　we　not？　　　Cal。　Granted。　　　Soc。　And　will　not　the　true　rhetorician　who　is　honest　and　understands　his　art　have　his　eye　fixed　upon　these；　in　all　the　words　which　he　addresses　to　the　souls　of　men；　and　in　all　his　actions；　both　in　what　he　gives　and　in　what　he　takes　away？　Will　not　his　aim　be　to　implant　justice　in　the　souls　of　his　citizens　mind　take　away　injustice；　to　implant　temperance　and　take　away　intemperance；　to　implant　every　virtue　and　take　away　every　vice？　Do　you　not　agree？　　　Cal。　I　agree。　　　Soc。　For　what　use　is　there；　Callicles；　in　giving　to　the　body　of　a　sick　man　who　is　in　a　bad　state　of　health　a　quantity　of　the　most　delightful　food　or　drink　or　any　other　pleasant　thing；　which　may　be　really　as　bad　for　him　as　if　you　gave　him　nothing；　or　even　worse　if　rightly　estimated。　Is　not　that　true？　　　Cal。　I　will　not　say　No　to　it。　　　Soc。　For　in　my　opinion　there　is　no　profit　in　a　man's　life　if　his　body　is　in　an　evil　plight…in　that　case　his　life　also　is　evil：　am　I　not　right？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　When　a　man　is　in　health　the　physicians　will　generally　allow　him　to　eat　when　he　is　hungry　and　drink　when　he　is　thirsty；　and　to　satisfy　his　desires　as　he　likes；　but　when　he　is　sick　they　hardly　suffer　him　to　satisfy　his　desires　at　all：　even　you　will　admit　that？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　does　not　the　same　argument　hold　of　the　soul；　my　good　sir？　While　she　is　in　a　bad　state　and　is　senseless　and　intemperate　and　unjust　and　unholy；　her　desires　ought　to　be　controlled；　and　she　ought　to　be　prevented　from　doing　anything　which　does　not　tend　to　her　own　improvement。　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Such　treatment　will　be　better　for　the　soul　herself？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　to　restrain　her　from　her　appetites　is　to　chastise　her？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　restraint　or　chastisement　is　better　for　the　soul　than　intemperance　or　the…absence　of　control；　which　you　were　just　now　preferring？　　　Cal。　I　do　not　understand　you；　Socrates；　and　I　wish　that　you　would　ask　some　one　who　does。　　　Soc。　Here　is　a　gentleman　who　cannot　endure　to　be　improved　or：　to　subject　himself　to　that　very　chastisement　of　which　the　argument　speaks！　　　Cal。　I　do　not　heed　a　word　of　what　you　are　saying；　and　have　only　answered　hitherto　out　of　civility　to　Gorgias。　　　Soc。　What　are　we　to　do；　then？　Shall　we　break　off　in　the　middle？　　　Cal。　You　shall　judge　for　yourself。　　　Soc。　Well；　but　people　say　that　〃a　tale　should　have　a　head　and　not　break　off　in　the　middle；〃　and　I　should　not　like　to　have　the　argument　going　about　without　a　head；　please　then　to　go　on　a　little　longer；　and　put　the　head　on。　　　Cal。　How　tyrannical　you　are；　Socrates！　I　wish　that　you　and　your　argument　would　rest；　or　that　you　would　get　some　one　else　to　argue　with　you。　　　Soc。　But　who　else　is　willing？…I　want　to　finish　the　argument。　　　Cal。　Cannot　you　finish　without　my　help；　either　talking　straight：　on；　or　questioning　and　answering　yourself？　　　Soc。　Must　I　then　say　with　Epicharmus；　〃Two　men　spoke　before；　but　now　one　shall　be　enough〃？　I　suppose　that　there　is　absolutely　no　help。　And　if　I　am　to　carry　on　the　enquiry　by　myself；　I　will　first　of　all　remark　that　not　only；　but　all　of　us　should　have　an　ambition　to　know　what　is　true　and　what　is　false　in　this　matter；　for　the　discovery　of　the　truth　is　common　good。　And　now　I　will　proceed　to　argue　according　to　my　own　notion。　But　if　any　of　you　think　that　I　arrive　at　conclusions　which　are　untrue　you　must　interpose　and　refute　me；　for　I　do　not　speak　from　any　knowledge　of　what　I　am　saying；　I　am　an　enquirer　like　yourselves；　and　therefore；　if　my　opponent　says　anything　which　is　of　force；　I　shall　be　the　first　to　agree　with　him。　I　am　speaking　on　the　supposition　that　the　argument　ought　to　be　completed；　but　if　you　think　otherwise　let　us　leave　off　and　go　our　ways。　　　Gor。　I　think；　Socrates；　that　we　should　not　go　our　ways　until　you　have　completed　the　argument；　and　this　appears　to　me　to　be　the　wish　of　the　rest　of　the　company；　I　myself　should　very　much　like　to　hear　what　more　you　have　to　say。　　　Soc。　I　too；　Gorgias；　should　have　liked　to　continue　the　argument　with　Callicles；　and　then　I　might　have　given　him　an　〃Amphion〃　in　return　for　his　〃Zethus〃；　but　since　you；　Callicles；　are　unwilling　to　continue；　I　hope　that　you　will　listen；　and　interrupt　me　if　I　seem　to　you　to　be　in　error。　And　if　you　refute　me；　I　shall　not　be　angry　with　you　as　you　are　with　me；　but　I　shall　inscribe　you　as　the　greatest　of　benefactors　on　the　tablets　of　my　soul。　　　Cal。　My　good　fellow；　never　mind　me；　but　get　on。　　　Soc。　Listen　to　me；　then；　while　I　recapitulate　the　argument：…Is　the　pleasant　the　same　as　the　good？　Not　the　same。　Callicles　and　I　are　agreed　about　that。　And　is　the　pleasant　to　be　pursued　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　or　the　good　for　the　sake　of　the　pleasant？　The　pleasant　is　to　be　pursued　for　the　sake　of　the　good。　And　that　is　pleasant　at　the　presence　of　which　we　are　pleased；　and　that　is　good　at　the　presence　of　which　we　are　good？　To　be　sure。　And　we…good；　and　all　good　things　whatever　are　good　when　some　virtue　is　present　in　us　or　them？　That；　Callicles；　is　my　conviction。　But　the　virtue　of　each　thing；　whether　body　or　soul；　instrument　or　creature；　when　given　to　them　in　the　best　way　comes　to　them　not　by　chance　but　as　the　result　of　the　order　and　truth　and　art　which　are　imparted　to　them：　Am　I　not　right？　I　maintain　that　I　am。　And　is　not　the　virtue　of　each　thing　dependent　on　order　or　arrangement？　Yes；　I　say。　And　that　which　makes　a　thing　good　is　the　proper　order　inhering　in　each　thing？　Such　is　my　view。　And　is　not　the　soul　which　has　an　order　of　her　own　better　than　that　which　has　no　order？　Certainly。　And　the　soul　which　has　order　is　orderly？　Of　course。　And　that　which　is　orderly　is　temperate？　Assuredly。　And　the　temperate　soul　is　good？　No　other　answer　can　I　give；　Callicles　dear；　have　you　any？　　　Cal。　Go　on；　my　good　fellow。　　　Soc。　Then　I　shall　proceed　to　add；　that　if　the；　temperate　soul　is　the　good　soul；　the　soul　which　is　in　the　opposite　condition；　that　is；　the　foolish　and　intemperate；　is　the　bad　soul。　Very　true。　　　And　will　not　the　temperate　man　do　what　is　proper；　both　in　relation　to　the　gods　and　to　men；　…for　he　would　not　be　temperate　if　he　did　not？　Certainly　he　will　do　what　is　proper。　In　his　relation　to　other　men　he　will　do　what　is　just；　See　and　in　his　relation　to　the　gods　he　will　do　what　is　holy；　and　he　who　does　what　is　just　and　holy　must　be　just　and　holy？　Very　true。　And　must　he　not　be　courageous？　for　the　duty　of　a　temperate　man　is　not　to　follow　or　to　avoid　what　he　ought　not；　but　what　he　ought；　whether　things　or　men　or　pleasures　or　pains；　and　patiently　to　endure　when　he　ought；　and　therefore；　Callicles；　the　temperate　man；　being；　as　we　have　described；　also　just　and　courageous　and　holy；　cannot　be　other　than　a　perfectly　good　man；　nor　can　the　good　man　do　otherwise　than　well　and　perfectly　whatever　he　does；　and　he　who　does　well　must　of　necessity　be　happy　and　blessed；　and　the　evil　man　who　does　evil；　miserable：　now　this　latter　is　he　whom　you　were　applauding…the　intemperate　who　is　the　opposite　of　the　temperate。　Such　is　my　position；　and　these　things　I　affirm　to　be　true。　And　if　they　are　true；　then　I　further　affirm　that　he　who　desires　to　be　happy　must　pursue　and　practise　temperance　and　run　away　from　intemperance　as　fast　as　his　legs　will　carry　him：　he　had　better　order　his　life　so　as　not　to　need　punishment；　but　if　either　he　or　any　of　his　friends；　whether　private　individual　or　city；　are　in　need　of　punishment；　then　justice　must　be　done　and　he　must　suffer　punishment；　if　he　would　be　happy。　This　appears　to　me　to　be　the　aim　which　a　man　ought　to　have；　and　towards　which　he　ought　to　direct　all　the　energies　both　of　himself