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per　cent　agio。　In　consequence　of　this　resolution；　the　agio　can

never　either　rise　above　five　or　sink　below　four　per　cent；　and　the

proportion　between　the　market　price　of　bank　and　that　of　current

money　is　kept　at　all　times　very　near　to　the　proportion　between

their　intrinsic　values。　Before　this　resolution　was　taken；　the

market　price　of　bank　money　used　sometimes　to　rise　so　high　as　nine

per　cent　agio；　and　sometimes　to　sink　so　low　as　par；　according　as

opposite　interests　happened　to　influence　the　market。

　　　　　The　Bank　of　Amsterdam　professes　to　lend　out　no　part　of　what

is　deposited　with　it；　but；　for　every　guilder　for　which　it　gives

credit　in　its　books；　to　keep　in　its　repositories　the　value　of　a

guilder　either　in　money　or　bullion。　That　it　keeps　in　its

repositories　all　the　money　or　bullion　for　which　there　are

receipts　in　force；　for　which　it　is　at　all　times　liable　to　be

called　upon；　and　which；　in　reality；　is　continually　going　from　it

and　returning　to　it　again；　cannot　well　be　doubted。　But　whether　it

does　so　likewise　with　regard　to　that　part　of　its　capital；　for

which　the　receipts　are　long　ago　expired；　for　which　in　ordinary

and　quiet　times　it　cannot　be　called　upon；　and　which　in　reality　is

very　likely　to　remain　with　it　for　ever；　or　as　long　as　the　States

of　the　United　Provinces　subsist；　may　perhaps　appear　more

uncertain。　At　Amsterdam；　however；　no　point　of　faith　is　better

established　than　that　for　every　guilder；　circulated　as　bank

money；　there　is　a　correspondent　guilder　in　gold　or　silver　to　be

found　in　the　treasure　of　the　bank。　The　city　is　guarantee　that　it

should　be　so。　The　bank　is　under　the　direction　of　the　four

reigning　burgomasters　who　are　changed　every　year。　Each　new　set　of

burgomasters　visits　the　treasure；　compares　it　with　the　books；

receives　it　upon　oath；　and　delivers　it　over；　with　the　same　awful

solemnity；　to　the　set　which　succeeds；　and　in　that　sober　and

religious　country　oaths　are　not　yet　disregarded。　A　rotation　of

this　kind　seems　alone　a　sufficient　security　against　any　practices

which　cannot　be　avowed。　Amidst　all　the　revolutions　which　faction

has　ever　occasioned　in　the　government　of　Amsterdam；　the

prevailing　party　has　at　no　time　accused　their　predecessors　of

infidelity　in　the　administration　of　the　bank。　No　accusation　could

have　affected　more　deeply　the　reputation　and　fortune　of　the

disgraced　party；　and　if　such　an　accusation　could　have　been

supported；　we　may　be　assured　that　it　would　have　been　brought。　In

1672；　when　the　French　king　was　at　Utrecht；　the　Bank　of　Amsterdam

paid　so　readily　as　left　no　doubt　of　the　fidelity　with　which　it

had　observed　its　engagements。　Some　of　the　pieces　which　were　then

brought　from　its　repositories　appeared　to　have　been　scorched　with

the　fire　which　happened　in　the　town…house　soon　after　the　bank　was

established。　Those　pieces；　therefore；　must　have　lain　there　from

that　time。

　　　　　What　may　be　the　amount　of　the　treasure　in　the　bank　is　a

question　which　has　long　employed　speculations　of　the　curious。

Nothing　but　conjecture　can　be　offered　concerning　it。　It　is

generally　reckoned　that　there　are　about　two　thousand　people　who

keep　accounts　with　the　bank；　and　allowing　them　to　have；　one　with

another；　the　value　of　fifteen　hundred　pounds　sterling　lying　upon

their　respective　accounts　（a　very　large　allowance）；　the　whole

quantity　of　bank　money；　and　consequently　of　treasure　in　the　bank；

will　amount　to　about　three　millions　sterling；　or；　at　eleven

guilders　the　pound　sterling；　thirty…three　millions　of　guilders…　a

great　sum；　and　sufficient　to　carry　on　a　very　extensive

circulation；　but　vastly　below　the　extravagant　ideas　which　some

people　have　formed　of　this　treasure。

　　　　　The　city　of　Amsterdam　derives　a　considerable　revenue　from

the　bank。　Besides　what　may　be　called　the　warehouse…rent　above

mentioned；　each　person；　upon　first　opening　an　account　with　the

bank；　pays　a　fee　of　ten　guilders；　and　for　every　new　account　three

guilders　three　stivers；　for　every　transfer　two　stivers；　and　if

the　transfer　is　for　less　than　three　hundred　guilders；　six

stivers；　in　order　to　discourage　the　multiplicity　of　small

transactions。　The　person　who　neglects　to　balance　his　account

twice　in　the　year　forfeits　twenty…five　guilders。　The　person　who

orders　a　transfer　for　more　than　is　upon　his　account；　is　obliged

to　pay　three　per　cent　for　the　sum　overdrawn；　and　his　order　is　set

aside　into　the　bargain。　The　bank　is　supposed；　too；　to　make　a

considerable　profit　by　the　sale　of　the　foreign　coin　or　bullion

which　sometimes　falls　to　it　by　the　expiring　of　receipts；　and

which　is　always　kept　till　it　can　be　sold　with　advantage。　It　makes

a　profit　likewise　by　selling　bank　money　at　five　per　cent　agio；

and　buying　it　in　at　four。　These　different　emoluments　amount　to　a

good　deal　more　than　what　is　necessary　for　paying　the　salaries　of

officers；　and　defraying　the　expense　of　management。　What　is　paid

for　the　keeping　of　bullion　upon　receipts　is　alone　supposed　to

amount　to　a　neat　annual　revenue　of　between　one　hundred　and　fifty

thousand　and　two　hundred　thousand　guilders。　Public　utility；

however；　and　not　revenue；　was　the　original　object　of　this

institution。　Its　object　was　to　relieve　the　merchants　from　the

inconvenience　of　a　disadvantageous　exchange。　The　revenue　which

has　arisen　from　it　was　unforeseen；　and　may　be　considered　as

accidental。　But　it　is　now　time　to　return　from　this　long

digression；　into　which　I　have　been　insensibly　led　in　endeavouring

to　explain　the　reasons　why　the　exchange　between　the　countries

which　pay　in　what　is　called　bank　money；　and　those　which　pay　in

common　currency；　should　generally　appear　to　be　in　favour　of　the

former　and　against　the　latter。　The　former　pay　in　a　species　of

money　of　which　the　intrinsic　value　is　always　the　same；　and

exactly　agreeable　to　the　standard　of　their　respective　mints；　the

latter　is　a　species　of　money　of　which　the　intrinsic　value　is

continually　varying；　and　is　almost　always　more　or　less　below　that

standard。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　2

　　　　　　　Of　the　Unreasonableness　of　those　extraordinary　Restraints

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　upon　other　Principles　

　　　　　IN　the　foregoing　part　of　this　chapter　I　have　endeavoured　to

show；　even　upon　the　principles　of　the　commercial　system；　how

unnecessary　it　is　to　lay　extraordinary　restraints　upon　the

importation　of　goods　from　those　countries　with　which　the　balance

of　trade　is　supposed　to　be　disadvantageous。

　　　　　Nothing；　however；　can　be　more　absurd　than　this　whole

doctrine　of　the　balance　of　trade；　upon　which；　not　only　these

restraints；　but　almost　all　the　other　regulations　of　commerce　are

founded。　When　two　places　trade　with　one　another；　this　doctrine

supposes　that；　if　the　balance　be　even；　neither　of　them　either

loses　or　gains；　but　if　it　leans　in　any　degree　to　one　side；　that

one　of　them　loses　and　the　other　gains　in　proportion　to　its

declension　from　the　exact　equilibrium。　Both　suppositions　are

false。　A　trade　which　is　forced　by　means　of　bounties　and

monopolies　may　be　and　commonly　is　disadvantageous　to　the　country

in　whose　favour　it　is　meant　to　be　established；　as　I　shall

endeavour　to　show　hereafter。　But　that　trade　which；　without　force

or　constraint；　is　naturally　and　regularly　carried　on　between　any

two　places　is　always　advantageous；　though　not　always　equally　so；

to　both。

　　　　　By　advantage　or　gain；　I　understand　not　the　increase　of　the

quantity　of　gold　and　silver；　but　that　of　the　exchangeable　value

of　the　annual　produce　of　the　land　and　labour　of　the　country；　or

the　increase　of　the　annual　revenue　of　its　inhabitants。

　　　　　If　the　balance　be　even；　and　if　the　trade　between　the　two

places　consist　altogether　in　the　exchange　of　their　native

commodities；　they　will；　upon　most　occasions；　not　only　both　gain；

but　they　will　gain　equally；　or　very　near　equally；　each　will　in

this　case　afford　a　market　for　a　part　of　the　surplus　produce　of

the　other；　each　will　replace　a　capital　which　had　been　employed　in

raising　and　preparing　for　the　market　this　part　of　the　surplus

produce　of　the　other；　and　which　had　been　distributed　among；　and

given　revenue　and　maintenance　to　a　certain　number　of　its

inhabitants。　Some　part　of　the　inhabitants　of　each；　therefore；

will　indirectly　derive　their　revenue　and　maintenance　from　the

other。　As　the　commodities　exchanged；　too；　are　supposed　to　be　of

equal　value；　so　the　two　capitals　employed　in　the　trade　will；　upon

most　occasions；　be　equal；　or　very　nearly　equal；　and　both　being

employed　in　raising　the　native　commodities　of　the　two　countries；

the　revenue　and　maintenance　which　their　distribution　will　afford

to　the　inhabitants　of　each　will　be　equal；　or　very　nearly　equal。

This　revenue　and　maintenance；　thus　mutually　afforded；　will　be

greater　or　smaller　in　proportion　to　the　extent　of　their　dealings。

If　these　should　annually　amount　to　an　hundred　thousand　pounds；

for　example；　or　to　a　million　on　each　side；　each　of　them　would

afford　an　annual　revenue　in　the　one　case　of　an　hundred　thousand

pounds；　in　the　other　of　a　million；　to　the　inhabitants　of　the

other。

　　　　　If　their　trade　should　be　of　such　a　nature　that　one　of　them

exported　to　the　other　nothing　but　native　commodities；　while　the

returns　of　that　other　consisted　altogether　in　foreign　goods；　the

balance；　in　this　case；　would　still　be　supposed　even；　commodities

being　paid　for　with　commodities。　They　would；　in　this　case　too；

both　gain；　but　they　would　not　gain　equally；　and　the　inhabitants

of　the　country　which　exported　nothing　but　native　commodities

would　derive　the　greatest　revenue　from　the　trade。　If　England；　for

example；　should　import　from　France　nothing　but　the　native

commodities　of　that　country；　and；　not　having　such　commodities　of

its　own　as　were　in　demand　there；　should　annually　repay　them　by

sending　thither　a　large　quantity　of　foreign　goods；　tobacco；　we

shall　suppose；　and　East　India　goods；　this　trade；　though　it　would

give　some　revenue　to　the　inhabitants　of　both　countries；　would

give　more　to　those　of　France　than　to　those　of　England。　The　whole

French　capital　annually　employed　in　it　would　annually　be

distributed　among　the　people　of　France。　But　that　part　of　the

English　capital　only　which　was　em