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of　London。　In　the　trade；　therefore；　to　which　those　regulations

confine　the　merchant　of　Hamburg；　his　capital　can　keep　in　constant

employment　a　much　greater　quantity　of　German　industry　than　it

possibly　could　have　done　in　the　trade　from　which　he　is　excluded。

Though　the　one　employment；　therefore；　may　to　him　perhaps　be　less

profitable　than　the　other；　it　cannot　be　less　advantageous　to　his

country。　It　is　quite　otherwise　with　the　employment　into　which　the

monopoly　naturally　attracts；　if　I　may　say　so；　the　capital　of　the

London　merchant。　That　employment　may；　perhaps；　be　more　profitable

to　him　than　the　greater　part　of　other　employments；　but；　on

account　of　the　slowness　of　the　returns；　it　cannot　be　more

advantageous　to　his　country。

　　　　　After　all　the　unjust　attempts；　therefore；　of　every　country

in　Europe　to　engross　to　itself　the　whole　advantage　of　the　trade

of　its　own　colonies；　no　country　has　yet　been　able　to　engross

itself　anything　but　the　expense　of　supporting　in　time　of　peace

and　of　defending　in　time　of　war　the　oppressive　authority　which　it

assumes　over　them。　The　inconveniencies　resulting　from　the

possession　of　its　colonies；　every　country　has　engrossed　to　itself

completely。　The　advantages　resulting　from　their　trade　it　has　been

obliged　to　share　with　many　other　countries。

　　　　　At　first　sight；　no　doubt；　the　monopoly　of　the　great　commerce

of　America　naturally　seems　to　be　an　acquisition　of　the　highest

value。　To　the　undiscerning　eye　of　giddy　ambition；　it　naturally

presents　itself　amidst　the　confused　scramble　of　politics　and　war

as　a　very　dazzling　object　to　fight　for。　The　dazzling　splendour　of

the　object；　however；　the　immense　greatness　of　the　commerce；　is

the　very　quality　which　renders　the　monopoly　of　it　hurtful；　or

which　makes　one　employment；　in　its　own　nature　necessarily　less

advantageous　to　the　country　than　the　greater　part　of　other

employments；　absorb　a　much　greater　proportion　of　the　capital　of

the　country　than　what　would　otherwise　have　gone　to　it。

　　　　　The　mercantile　stock　of　every　country；　it　has　been　shown　in

the　second　book；　naturally　seeks；　if　one　may　say　so；　the

employment　most　advantageous　to　that　country。　If　it　is　employed

in　the　carrying　trade；　the　country　to　which　it　belongs　becomes

the　emporium　of　the　goods　of　all　the　countries　whose　trade　that

stock　carries　on。　But　the　owner　of　that　stock　necessarily　wishes

to　dispose　of　as　great　a　part　of　those　goods　as　he　can　at　home。

He　thereby　saves　himself　the　trouble；　risk；　and　expense　of

exportation；　and　he　will　upon　that　account　be　glad　to　sell　them

at　home；　not　only　for　a　much　smaller　price；　but　with　somewhat　a

smaller　profit　than　he　might　expect　to　make　by　sending　them

abroad。　He　naturally；　therefore；　endeavours　as　much　as　he　can　to

turn　his　carrying　trade　into　a　foreign　trade　of　consumption。　If

his　stock；　again；　is　employed　in　a　foreign　trade　of　consumption；

he　will；　for　the　same　reason；　be　glad　to　dispose　of　at　home　as

great　a　part　as　he　can　of　the　home　goods；　which　he　collects　in

order　to　export　to　some　foreign　market；　and　he　will　thus

endeavour；　as　much　as　he　can；　to　turn　his　foreign　trade　of

consumption　into　a　home　trade。　The　mercantile　stock　of　every

country　naturally　courts　in　this　manner　the　near；　and　shuns　the

distant　employment；　naturally　courts　the　employment　in　which　the

returns　are　frequent；　and　shuns　that　in　which　they　are　distant

and　slow；　naturally　courts　the　employment　in　which　it　can

maintain　the　greatest　quantity　of　productive　labour　in　the

country　to　which　it　belongs；　or　in　which　its　owner　resides；　and

shuns　that　in　which　it　can　maintain　there　the　smallest　quantity。

It　naturally　courts　the　employment　which　in　ordinary　cases　is

most　advantageous；　and　shuns　that　which　in　ordinary　cases　is

least　advantageous　to　that　country。

　　　　　But　if　in　any　of　those　distant　employments；　which　in

ordinary　cases　are　less　advantageous　to　the　country；　the　profit

should　happen　to　rise　somewhat　higher　than　what　is　sufficient　to

balance　the　natural　preference　which　is　given　to　nearer

employments；　this　superiority　of　profit　will　draw　stock　from

those　nearer　employments；　till　the　profits　of　all　return　to　their

proper　level。　This　superiority　of　profit；　however；　is　a　proof

that；　in　the　actual　circumstances　of　the　society；　those　distant

employments　are　somewhat　understocked　in　proportion　to　other

employments；　and　that　the　stock　of　the　society　is　not　distributed

in　the　properest　manner　among　all　the　different　employments

carried　on　in　it。　It　is　a　proof　that　something　is　either　bought

cheaper　or　sold　dearer　than　it　ought　to　be；　and　that　some

particular　class　of　citizens　is　more　or　less　oppressed　either　by

paying　more　or　by　getting　less　than　what　is　suitable　to　that

equality　which　ought　to　take　place；　and　which　naturally　does　take

place　among　all　the　different　classes　of　them。　Though　the　same

capital　never　will　maintain　the　same　quantity　of　productive

labour　in　a　distant　as　in　a　near　employment；　yet　a　distant

employment　may　be　as　necessary　for　the　welfare　of　the　society　as

a　near　one；　the　goods　which　the　distant　employment　deals　in　being

necessary；　perhaps；　for　carrying　on　many　of　the　nearer

employments。　But　if　the　profits　of　those　who　deal　in　such　goods

are　above　their　proper　level；　those　goods　will　be　sold　dearer

than　they　ought　to　be；　or　somewhat　above　their　natural　price；　and

all　those　engaged　in　the　nearer　employments　will　be　more　or　less

oppressed　by　this　high　price。　Their　interest；　therefore；　in　this

case　requires　that　some　stock　should　be　withdrawn　from　those

nearer　employments；　and　turned　towards　that　distant　one；　in　order

to　reduce　its　profits　to　their　proper　level；　and　the　price　of　the

goods　which　it　deals　in　to　their　natural　price。　In　this

extraordinary　case；　the　public　interest　requires　that　some　stock

should　be　withdrawn　from　those　employments　which　in　ordinary

cases　are　more　advantageous；　and　turned　towards　one　which　in

ordinary　cases　is　less　advantageous　to　the　public；　and　in　this

extraordinary　case　the　natural　interests　and　inclinations　of　men

coincide　as　exactly　with　the　public　interest　as　in　all　other

ordinary　cases；　and　lead　them　to　withdraw　stock　from　the　near；

and　to　turn　it　towards　the　distant　employment。

　　　　　It　is　thus　that　the　private　interests　and　passions　of

individuals　naturally　dispose　them　to　turn　their　stocks　towards

the　employments　which　in　ordinary　cases　are　most　advantageous　to

the　society。　But　if　from　this　natural　preference　they　should　turn

too　much　of　it　towards　those　employments；　the　fall　of　profit　in

them　and　the　rise　of　it　in　all　others　immediately　dispose　them　to

alter　this　faulty　distribution。　Without　any　intervention　of　law；

therefore；　the　private　interests　and　passions　of　men　naturally

lead　them　to　divide　and　distribute　the　stock　of　every　society

among　all　the　different　employments　carried　on　in　it　as　nearly　as

possible　in　the　proportion　which　is　most　agreeable　to　the

interest　of　the　whole　society。

　　　　　All　the　different　regulations　of　the　mercantile　system

necessarily　derange　more　or　less　this　natural　and　most

advantageous　distribution　of　stock。　But　those　which　concern　the

trade　to　America　and　the　East　Indies　derange　it　perhaps　more　than

any　other；　because　the　trade　to　those　two　great　continents

absorbs　a　greater　quantity　of　stock　than　any　two　other　branches

of　trade。　The　regulations；　however；　by　which　this　derangement　is

effected　in　those　two　different　branches　of　trade　are　not

altogether　the　same。　Monopoly　is　the　great　engine　of　both；　but　it

is　a　different　sort　of　monopoly。　Monopoly　of　one　kind　or　another；

indeed；　seems　to　be　the　sole　engine　of　the　mercantile　system。

　　　　　In　the　trade　to　America　every　nation　endeavours　to　engross

as　much　as　possible　the　whole　market　of　its　own　colonies　by

fairly　excluding　all　other　nations　from　any　direct　trade　to　them。

During　the　greater　part　of　the　sixteenth　century；　the　Portuguese

endeavoured　to　manage　the　trade　to　the　East　Indies　in　the　same

manner；　by　claiming　the　sole　right　of　sailing　in　the　Indian　seas；

on　account　of　the　merit　of　having　first　found　out　the　road　to

them。　The　Dutch　still　continue　to　exclude　all　other　European

nations　from　any　direct　trade　to　their　spice　islands。　Monopolies

of　this　kind　are　evidently　established　against　all　other　European

nations；　who　are　thereby　not　only　excluded　from　a　trade　to　which

it　might　be　convenient　for　them　to　turn　some　part　of　their　stock；

but　are　obliged　to　buy　the　goods　which　that　trade　deals　in

somewhat　dearer　than　if　they　could　import　them　themselves

directly　from　the　countries　which　produce　them。

　　　　　But　since　the　fall　of　the　power　of　Portugal；　no　European

nation　has　claimed　the　exclusive　right　of　sailing　in　the　Indian

seas；　of　which　the　principal　ports　are　now　open　to　the　ships　of

all　European　nations。　Except　in　Portugal；　however；　and　within

these　few　years　in　France；　the　trade　to　the　East　Indies　has　in

every　European　country　been　subjected　to　an　exclusive　company。

Monopolies　of　this　kind　are　properly　established　against　the　very

nation　which　erects　them。　The　greater　part　of　that　nation　are

thereby　not　only　excluded　from　a　trade　to　which　it　might　be

convenient　for　them　to　turn　some　part　of　their　stock；　but　are

obliged　to　buy　the　goods　which　that　trade　deals　somewhat　dearer

than　if　it　was　open　and　free　to　all　their　countrymen。　Since　the

establishment　of　the　English　East　India　Company；　for　example；　the

other　inhabitants　of　England；　over　and　above　being　excluded　from

the　trade；　must　have　paid　in　the　price　of　the　East　India　goods

which　they　have　consumed；　not　only　for　all　the　extraordinary

profits　which　the　company　may　have　made　upon　those　goods　in

consequence　of　their　monopoly；　but　for　all　the　extraordinary

waste　which　the　fraud　and　abuse；　inseparable　from　the　management

of　the　affairs　of　so　great　a　company；　must　necessarily　have

occasioned。　The　absurdity　of　this　second　kind　of　monopoly；

therefore；　is　much　more　manifest　than　that　of　the　first。

　　　　　Both　these　kinds　of　monopolies　derange　more　or　less　the

natural　distribution　of　the　stock　of　the　society；　but　they　do